CVE-2026-71883 (GCVE-0-2026-71883)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-03 08:38 – Updated: 2026-10-03 08:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Native AES packet cipher returns the raw AES key on an alias
Summary
In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller's key, IV and additional authenticated data arrays with JNI's ReleaseByteArrayElements in mode 0, which commits the native copy back into the Java array. Those arrays are read-only to the native code, and on a JVM that returns a copy rather than a pin the copy still holds the input bytes as they were read. The output buffer is taken through a separate critical region and committed first, so where an application passed the same Java array as both an input and the destination - encrypting in place over KeyParameter.getKey(), for example - the later mode-0 release of the key wrote the unchanged key bytes over the ciphertext that had just been produced. The call still returned the correct output length, so an application encrypting in place over its own key array was handed the raw AES key where it expected ciphertext, with nothing in the API to indicate it, and would transmit or store the key in place of the message. The read-only input arrays are now released with JNI_ABORT, freeing the native copy without copying it back, and mode 0 is reserved for arrays the native code wrote. The pure-Java packet ciphers and the streaming native modes are not affected. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it ships no native implementations.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%9… | vendor-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. | BC-LTS-JAVA |
Affected:
2.73.4 , < 2.73.13
(maven)
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java-lts/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"core"
],
"packageName": "bcprov-lts8on",
"packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.bouncycastle/bcprov-lts8on",
"platforms": [
"x86",
"x86-64"
],
"product": "BC-LTS-JAVA",
"programFiles": [
"cbc_pc_jni.c",
"ccm_pc_jni.c",
"cfb_pc_jni.c",
"ctr_pc_jni.c",
"gcm_pc_jni.c",
"gcm_siv_pc_jni.c"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-lts-java",
"vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.73.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.73.4",
"versionType": "maven"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eIn Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller\u0027s key, IV and additional authenticated data arrays with JNI\u0027s ReleaseByteArrayElements in mode 0, which commits the native copy back into the Java array. Those arrays are read-only to the native code, and on a JVM that returns a copy rather than a pin the copy still holds the input bytes as they were read. The output buffer is taken through a separate critical region and committed first, so where an application passed the same Java array as both an input and the destination - encrypting in place over KeyParameter.getKey(), for example - the later mode-0 release of the key wrote the unchanged key bytes over the ciphertext that had just been produced. The call still returned the correct output length, so an application encrypting in place over its own key array was handed the raw AES key where it expected ciphertext, with nothing in the API to indicate it, and would transmit or store the key in place of the message. The read-only input arrays are now released with JNI_ABORT, freeing the native copy without copying it back, and mode 0 is reserved for arrays the native code wrote. The pure-Java packet ciphers and the streaming native modes are not affected. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it ships no native implementations.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller\u0027s key, IV and additional authenticated data arrays with JNI\u0027s ReleaseByteArrayElements in mode 0, which commits the native copy back into the Java array. Those arrays are read-only to the native code, and on a JVM that returns a copy rather than a pin the copy still holds the input bytes as they were read. The output buffer is taken through a separate critical region and committed first, so where an application passed the same Java array as both an input and the destination - encrypting in place over KeyParameter.getKey(), for example - the later mode-0 release of the key wrote the unchanged key bytes over the ciphertext that had just been produced. The call still returned the correct output length, so an application encrypting in place over its own key array was handed the raw AES key where it expected ciphertext, with nothing in the API to indicate it, and would transmit or store the key in place of the message. The read-only input arrays are now released with JNI_ABORT, freeing the native copy without copying it back, and mode 0 is reserved for arrays the native code wrote. The pure-Java packet ciphers and the streaming native modes are not affected. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it ships no native implementations."
}
],
"metrics": [
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "AMBER",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-200",
"description": "CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T08:38:18.749Z",
"orgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630",
"shortName": "bcorg"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071883"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Native AES packet cipher returns the raw AES key on an alias",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bc release-notes template"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630",
"assignerShortName": "bcorg",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-71883",
"datePublished": "2026-10-03T08:38:18.749Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-08T00:06:06.982Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T08:38:18.749Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-71883",
"date": "2026-10-03",
"epss": "0.00253",
"percentile": "0.15227"
}
}
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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