RUSTSEC-2026-0328

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-19 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-03 07:29 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
`decompress`: tar-family extractors write archive entries without a path-traversal check (tar-slip)
Details

The tar-family extractors in decompress (.tar, .tar.gz, .tar.xz, .tar.bz2, .tar.zst) build each output path from the raw archive entry path and write to it with no traversal check, so a malicious archive can write files outside the destination directory, a "tar-slip" / zip-slip path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23).

In src/decompressors/tar_common.rs (tar_extract):

let filepath = entry.path()?;                                    // raw entry path
let filepath = filepath.components().skip(opts.strip).collect::<PathBuf>();
                                     // strips leading components only — keeps `..`
let outpath = to.join(filepath);
// ...
let mut outfile = fs::File::create(&outpath)?;                   // writes anywhere

.components().skip(opts.strip) removes a fixed number of leading path components but leaves interior .. components intact so an entry named e.g. ../../../../home/<user>/.bashrc, or an absolute path, resolves outside to. This affects all platforms.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "code-execution"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "decompress::decompress"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "decompress",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/decompress"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "The tar-family extractors in `decompress` (`.tar`, `.tar.gz`, `.tar.xz`,\n`.tar.bz2`, `.tar.zst`) build each output path from the **raw archive entry path**\nand write to it with no traversal check, so a malicious archive can write files\n**outside** the destination directory, a \"tar-slip\" / zip-slip path traversal\n(CWE-22 / CWE-23).\n\nIn `src/decompressors/tar_common.rs` (`tar_extract`):\n\n```rust\nlet filepath = entry.path()?;                                    // raw entry path\nlet filepath = filepath.components().skip(opts.strip).collect::\u003cPathBuf\u003e();\n                                     // strips leading components only \u2014 keeps `..`\nlet outpath = to.join(filepath);\n// ...\nlet mut outfile = fs::File::create(\u0026outpath)?;                   // writes anywhere\n```\n\n`.components().skip(opts.strip)` removes a fixed number of *leading* path\ncomponents but leaves interior `..` components intact so an entry named \ne.g. `../../../../home/\u003cuser\u003e/.bashrc`, or an absolute path, resolves **outside** \n`to`. This affects all platforms.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0328",
  "modified": "2026-10-03T07:29:09Z",
  "published": "2026-09-19T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/decompress"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0328.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/rusty-ferris-club/decompress/issues/21"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`decompress`: tar-family extractors write archive entries without a path-traversal check (tar-slip)"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.