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CVE-2026-76219 (GCVE-0-2026-76219)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 14:02 – Updated: 2026-08-20 15:23- CWE-88 - Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-be… | third-party-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| gitpython-developers | GitPython |
Affected:
0 , < 3.1.58
(semver)
Unaffected: 3.1.58 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
{
"containers": {
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"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-76219",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-20T13:47:26.740686Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T15:23:10.823Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageURL": "pkg:pypi/GitPython",
"product": "GitPython",
"vendor": "gitpython-developers",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3.1.58",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "3.1.58",
"versionType": "semver"
}
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"cpeApplicability": [
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"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "3.1.58",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "manus-use"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "bhaswanthc"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-08-04T00:00:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 7.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
},
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{
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"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-88",
"description": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
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"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: GitPython before 3.1.58 Arbitrary File Overwrite via read-tree",
"tags": [
"third-party-advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"title": "GitPython before 3.1.58 Arbitrary File Overwrite via read-tree",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
}
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},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-76219",
"datePublished": "2026-08-19T14:02:03.425Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-19T11:35:13.689Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T15:23:10.823Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
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BDU:2026-12059 (CVE-2026-76219)
Vulnerability from fstec – Published: 2026-08-24 – Updated: 2026-09-28 – View on bdu.fstec.ru Exploit publicly available Fixed- CWE-88 - Внедрение или модификация аргумента
{
"CVSS 2.0": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:C/A:C",
"CVSS 3.0": "AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"CVSS 4.0": "AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
"remediation_\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435": null,
"\u0412\u0435\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0440 \u041f\u041e": "\u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb, \u0421\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
"\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041f\u041e": "7.3 (\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421), 8.0 (\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421), \u0434\u043e 3.1.58 (GitPython)",
"\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f:\nhttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0420\u0435\u0434 \u041e\u0421: http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/8.0/x86_64/updates/\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0420\u0435\u0434 \u041e\u0421: http://repo.red-soft.ru/redos/7.3c/x86_64/updates/",
"\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "04.08.2026",
"\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "28.09.2026",
"\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "24.08.2026",
"\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2026-12059",
"\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "CVE-2026-76219",
"\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
"\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430",
"\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "\u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), GitPython",
"\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": "\u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 7.3 (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751), \u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0420\u0435\u0434 \u0421\u043e\u0444\u0442\u00bb \u0420\u0415\u0414 \u041e\u0421 8.0 (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0432 \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c \u21163751)",
"\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0432 IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset \u0438 IndexFile.merge_tree \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 Python \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0437\u0430\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u0441 git-\u0440\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438 GitPython, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b",
"\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0421\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0435",
"\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u0412\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0430\u0440\u0433\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 (CWE-88)",
"\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0432 IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset \u0438 IndexFile.merge_tree \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 Python \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0437\u0430\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u0441 git-\u0440\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438 GitPython \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u0430\u0440\u0433\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043e\u0432. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u044b",
"\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
"\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
"\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
"\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
"\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
"\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u0418\u043d\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f",
"\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p\nhttps://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/\nhttps://redos.red-soft.ru/support/secure/",
"\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
"\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430, \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u041f\u041e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c",
"\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-88",
"\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 8,5)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 8,1)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 4.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,2)"
}
BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:39 – Updated: 2026-09-11 15:20 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "aider",
"purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.46",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.46"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-11T15:20:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:39:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-APM-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:39 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:40 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "apm",
"purl": "pkg:brew/apm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.28.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-apm-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:40:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:39:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-BTCLI-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:42 – Updated: 2026-09-10 18:57 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.51",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "btcli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/btcli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.51",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.51"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-btcli-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-10T18:57:19Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:42:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-CF2TF-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:42 – Updated: 2026-10-02 09:09 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cf2tf",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cf2tf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.2_8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-cf2tf-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-10-02T09:09:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:42:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-CHECKOV-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:43 – Updated: 2026-09-20 12:11 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "checkov",
"purl": "pkg:brew/checkov"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.616"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.0_4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-checkov-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-20T12:11:46Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:43:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-COBO-CLI-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:43 – Updated: 2026-09-10 19:01 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.50",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cobo-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cobo-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.8_7"
},
{
"introduced": "0.1.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.50",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.50"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-cobo-cli-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-10T19:01:17Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:43:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-CONDA-LOCK-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:44 – Updated: 2026-10-02 09:12 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "conda-lock",
"purl": "pkg:brew/conda-lock"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.2_5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-conda-lock-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-10-02T09:12:46Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:44:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-CRUFT-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:44 – Updated: 2026-10-02 10:42 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cruft",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cruft"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.16.0_14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-cruft-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-10-02T10:42:45Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:44:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
BREW-CYCODE-CVE-2026-76219 (GHSA-4GMW-GG2M-W46P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-20 08:45 – Updated: 2026-09-10 19:04 – Source websiteSummary
IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset (→ from_tree) and IndexFile.merge_tree append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to git read-tree with no unsafe-option guard, no allow_unsafe_options parameter, and no -- separator. git read-tree --index-output=<file> writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected --index-output override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit 3af0c251 (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only checkout_index and tag; read_tree was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).
Root Cause
from_tree (index/base.py:388), reset (delegates to from_tree), and merge_tree (index/base.py:291) call repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list) with no check_unsafe_options and no --. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")
# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
Attack Chain
- Entry: app calls
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)/reset(commit=…)/merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)with attackertreeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc". - Check: NONE — the methods have no
allow_unsafe_optionsand never callcheck_unsafe_options. - Sink:
repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)— no--. argv (from_tree, observed):['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim'](last-wins). - Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>') → victim overwritten; before=IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT, after starts DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02… (destructive clobber, valid index blob). reset(commit=…) and both merge_tree positionals verified. Fix-commit read: 3af0c251 touched only checkout_index+tag; read_tree untouched on HEAD.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to from_tree/reset/merge_tree, and/or place a -- separator before the positional treeish arguments; block --index-output (a path-taking option) on this sink.
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{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "gitpython",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "cycode",
"purl": "pkg:brew/cycode"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.18.0_2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
"name": "gitpython",
"resource": "gitpython",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.1.62"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=\u003cfile\u003e` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method\u0027s internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory\u0027s sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n## Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill\u0027s \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n# target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2. Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027read-tree\u0027,\u0027--index-output=\u003ctmp\u003e\u0027,\u0027--index-output=/\u2026/victim\u0027]` (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,\u0027--index-output=\u003cvictim\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.",
"id": "BREW-cycode-CVE-2026-76219",
"modified": "2026-09-10T19:04:11Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T08:45:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-overwrite-via-read-tree"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p",
"CVE-2026-76219",
"PYSEC-2026-3838"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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